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During the quarter century from 1980/81 to 2004/05, South Asian economies grew at the respectable rate of 5.5 per cent per annum​[1]​ – less spectacular than the growth rates achieved by East Asia (8.1 per cent) or China (9.8) but vastly superior to those in Latin America (2.3 per cent) and sub-Saharan Africa (2.6 per cent). This record of middling performance was true as much of Bangladesh as of the rest of South Asia. In one respect, though, Bangladesh may appear to be the weak link of the region – her average growth rate of 4.5 per cent during the quarter century was just below that of Sri Lanka (4.6 per cent) and well below those of Pakistan (5.3 per cent) and India (5.8 per cent).

There is, however, another part of the story that reveals Bangladesh in a much more favourable light. Bangladesh is the only country of South Asia in which growth rate accelerated consistently from decade to decade – from 3.8 per cent in the 1980s it went up to 4.8 per cent in the 1990s and 5.4 per cent in the first half of the present decade. By contrast, the growth rate faltered in India and Pakistan in the 1990s and in Sri Lanka during 2001-2005 (Table 1). India recovered well enough in the last five years of the period to enjoy a growth rate that was slightly above the rate of the 1980s, but Pakistan never recovered to that extent. Taking the quarter century as a whole, one finds either no significant acceleration or a slight deceleration in the rest of the region in contrast with consistent acceleration experienced by Bangladesh.​[2]​ It is this distinctive feature of Bangladesh’s growth experience that forms the subject matter of this paper – a feature that has not been as widely acknowledged as it deserves to be, let alone being analysed. The paper will argue that that the conduct of fiscal policy has a lot to do with the contrasting experience of Bangladesh as compared to the rest of South Asia. 

The gist of the argument is that Bangladesh has been able to sustain growth acceleration, albeit to a modest degree, by avoiding the kind of fiscal deficits that has plagued the rest of the region. The argument proceeds in two parts. First, it is argued in section II that the contrast between Bangladesh and the rest of the region in terms of growth acceleration reflects a corresponding contrast in terms of public investment – Bangladesh fares better in terms of improving the rate of public investment over time. Second, it is argued in section III that the contrast in public investment is itself a consequence of contrasting incidence of fiscal deficits. Large and persistent fiscal deficits financed by domestic borrowing constrained the ability of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka to maintain the rate of public investment, while Bangladesh avoided the problem by keeping a tight leash on debt-financed deficits. Section IV summarises the main arguments and makes some concluding observations.


II. Public Investment and Growth





Growth of GDP in South Asia: 1980 – 2005























Source: Calculated by the author from national and international sources.


A more promising line of enquiry lies in observing the trend of investment over time, as there is no doubt that, for all that we have learnt about the sources of growth from the recent outpouring of the literature on growth economics, sustained investment still remains the bedrock of sustained economic growth. It is instructive to note that the investment rate rose steeply in Bangladesh from 16.7 per cent of GDP in the 1980s to 23.6 per cent during 2001-2005, while by contrast it increased rather weakly in India – from 21.2 per cent to 26.3 per cent – during the same period, and actually fell in the other two countries – from 18.8 to 17.2 in Pakistan and from 25.1 to 23.4 in Sri Lanka (Table 2). The consistency of growth performance or the lack of it in South Asian countries is thus clearly in conformity with differential trends in investment.





























  Public 	5.05	3.45	2.75
  Private	20.03	22.01	20.60
Gross domestic savings	13.25	16.29	15.86
	 Source: Calculated by the author from national and international sources.













     Tax revenue	5.32	7.19	8.21
Total expenditure	12.64	13.73	14.81
     Revenue expenditure	6.73	8.06	9.08




     Tax revenue	15.04	14.63	14.75
Total expenditure	28.84	26.87	29.43
     Revenue expenditure	10.73	12.06	14.80




     Tax revenue	13.80	13.40	10.80
Total expenditure	24.90	24.10	17.86
     Revenue expenditure	17.60	19.40	15.02




     Tax revenue	17.48	16.53	14.00
Total expenditure	32.81	28.20	24.96
     Revenue expenditure	19.47	21.12	19.07
     Development expenditure	13.34	7.08	5.09




The picture that emerges from the preceding observations may be summed up as follows. Bangladesh may have been the weakest of the South Asian economies in the last quarter century in terms of indicators such as average growth rate, the rate of investment and the share of development expenditure in GDP, but unlike its richer neighbours Bangladesh was able to sustain accelerated growth during this period by improving public investment that also had a stimulating effect on private investment. In the rest of the region, declining public investment had a constraining effect on growth not only directly but also indirectly by holding back the growth of private investment. Strong autonomous growth of private investment in India and Pakistan did tend to pull up the economy, but it was the failure of to raise the rate of public investment that prevented them from achieving sustained growth acceleration. In Sri Lanka, the constraining effect of declining public investment was so severe that private investment was unable to surge ahead on its own (unlike in India and Pakistan), which led inevitably to growth deceleration.

There has been much debate about whether public investment crowds in or crowds out private investment. Much of this debate is pointless, because clearly both outcomes are possible depending on the circumstances. It is arguable, however, that given the current low levels of development of infrastructure and human capital in South Asia, compared to the high-performing countries of East and South-East Asia, public investment has an indispensable catalytic role to play in this region. In this backdrop, it is entirely plausible to argue that sustained rates of public investment has enabled Bangladesh to maintain a steady acceleration of growth while the secular decline in the rate of public investment in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka is at least partly responsible for their failure to achieve sustained growth acceleration.


III. Fiscal Deficits, Interest Burden and Public Investment

This raises the question, how did Bangladesh manage to raise or maintain public investment and development expenditure as shares of GDP, while its richer neighbours failed to do so. This is the central question the present paper seeks to investigate. The question assumes special significance in the backdrop of several structural problems that Bangladesh has faced in the last quarter century. For instance, steep decline in foreign aid (much steeper than in any other country of South Asia) has caused a crisis of investible resources. By the time Bangladesh recovered from the trauma of its war of Liberation, in the early 1980s, the economy had become highly dependent on foreign aid, which accounted for almost one-third of gross investment; by 2005 the proportion came down to less than 10 per cent. On top of this, Bangladesh has been plagued by severe problems of governance – manifested in endemic corruption and political sclerosis. Quite how the country managed to outperform the rest of South Asia in terms of improving the rate of public investment despite these odds does seem to be a major puzzle.

Part of the answer lies in differential success on the revenue front. As can be seen from Table 3, Bangladesh is the only country in the region that has been able to raise the share of government revenue in GDP consistently over the quarter century under consideration. In comparative terms, the revenue effort in Bangladesh is pretty weak, which is evidenced by the fact that government revenue as percentage of GDP has always been lower in Bangladesh than in any other South Asian country. But the important point to note here is that even though it is low it has at least grown consistently over the years – from 6.5 per cent in the 1980s to 9 per cent in the 1990s and further to 10.3 per cent during 2001-2005. This has allowed the government to improve or at least sustain the rates of public investment and development expenditure. By contrast, in all other South Asian countries, the performance on the revenue front has either worsened or at best stagnated over time. Thus, in India, the volume of revenue as percentage of GDP has fallen slightly from 19 per cent in the 1980s to 18.5 per cent during 2001-2005; in Pakistan, it has fallen from 17.3 per cent to 14.1 per cent during the same period; and in Sri Lanka, it has fallen from 20.1 per cent to 16.1 per cent. Evidently, falling or stagnating share of revenue in GDP has constrained the ability of these countries to sustain the rate of public investment.

But this is not the whole story. The most striking feature of the figures presented in Table 3 is that the burden of adjustment to weakness on the revenue front in the rest of South Asia has fallen disproportionately on development expenditure (and by implication on public investment), leaving revenue expenditure relatively unscathed. In fact, in India falling development expenditure (as percentage of GDP) has gone hand in hand with rising revenue expenditure; in Sri Lanka revenue expenditure has barely fallen over the course of the quarter century while development expenditure has been less than halved; and in Pakistan, revenue expenditure has fallen only slightly from 17.6 to 15 per cent, while development expenditure has nosedived from 7.3 to 2.8 per cent. Clearly, in each of these countries, revenue expenditure has been either cushioned or bolstered in the face of stagnant or weakening revenue earnings, thereby forcing the share of development expenditure to decline – in some cases precipitously.

What was the compulsion in these countries that made the protection or even enhancement of revenue expenditure necessary even at the cost of development expenditure? Many reasons could be cited – for instance, the political difficulty of reducing subsidies in the face of stiff opposition from vested interests, which is a common phenomenon in all these countries, and on top of this there was the burden of war-related expenditures in the face of Tamil separatist movement in Sri Lanka and the Afghan war in the case of Pakistan. These are well-known pressures on government budgets. But an additional pressure has emerged over the years, which has gone relatively unnoticed – it is the payment of interest on government debt, mainly domestic debt.​[3]​






























The severity of the problem that has emerged as a result of rising interest burden can be appreciated by comparing the share of interest payment in GDP with that of development expenditure. Surprising as it may seem, interest payment actually accounted for a higher share of GDP than development expenditure in Pakistan and Sri Lanka during 2001-2005. In India, the share of development expenditure remained higher, but the gap has narrowed considerably over time – in the 1980s, interest payment amounted to one-sixth of development expenditure, by 2001-2005 it became slightly less than half. Clearly, in each of these countries the rising burden of interest payment has prevented them from absorbing the burden of weakening revenue earnings through a corresponding reduction of revenue expenditure; as a result, the burden of adjustment has fallen inevitably on development expenditure and thus on public investment. Bangladesh has been spared of this fate partly because of its relative success in improving the revenue performance and partly because its interest burden has remained well below that of its neighbours.

This leads us to the next question: why does the burden of interest differ so much as between Bangladesh and the rest of the region? In order to find the answer to this question, we shall have to look back at the conduct of macroeconomic policy, and in particular of fiscal policy, over the decades, as the current burden of interest payment is but a consequence of the past pattern of government borrowing. We shall argue that the seeds of the current predicament were sown in the 1980s (in some cases starting from the late 1970s), when the whole of South Asia was trying to emerge from the economic doldrums in which it had found itself in the 1970s.

Looking back at the economic history of South Asia during the post-British period, one finds that after enjoying a couple of decades of vibrant economic growth each of the South Asian countries plunged into an economic quagmire somewhere around 1970, from which they could manage to emerge only towards the end of the decade. The period of economic slowdown, which spanned most of the 1970s, has been described elsewhere as the ‘dismal decade’ of South Asia in  analogy with the Latin American ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s (Osmani, 2008).​[4]​ Precisely why and how each of the South Asian countries plunged into the dismal decade at around the same time is an interesting question, but the details of that story need not detain us here. For us, the more relevant question is how they managed to get out of the doldrums by engineering an economic revival that despite some ups and down along the way continues till today. There were both commonalties and differences across the countries in the policy regime that helped revive economic growth. We shall argue that it is the differences in the policy regime that helps explain why the fiscal constraint appears to be less severe in Bangladesh today as compared to the rest of the region.

To put the discussion into context, it is necessary to digress a little on the forces behind economic upturns and downturns in South Asia.​[5]​ The dominant view on this matter is that economic vibrancy of the 1950s and 1960s was built upon a strategy of import substituting industrialization that ran out of steam in the 1970s, leading to the travails of the ‘dismal decade’. This view further contends that it was only with liberalising reforms, especially reforms aimed at trade liberalisation, that the region was able to make the transition to a higher growth path from the 1980s onward. On closer examination, however, this view is found to contain only a part of the truth, both regarding the downturn in the 1970s and the subsequent upturn. To blame the import substitution strategy for the retardation of growth in the dismal decade or to credit its abandonment (or at least weakening) for the subsequent recovery of growth is to accord a primacy to trade policy it does not deserve, because both retardation and recovery were outcomes of a broader range of policies interacting with a number of conjunctural factors.

The most important policy failure that precipitated the crisis of the ‘dismal decade’ lay in the intensification of state control in all spheres of the economy, of which intensification of trade restrictions was only a part. Of more momentous consequence was the fact that in an extra-ordinary congruence of populist rhetoric across the region the political rulers of the region all invoked the egalitarian appeal of socialism in the 1970s. The motivation behind this burst of populism may have differed, but the common effect was to spread the tentacles of an overbearing state in every nook and cranny of the economy, thereby distorting the market and stifling the dynamism of private enterprise. Yet another policy failure, especially in India and to a lesser extent in Sri Lanka, lay in the adoption of an excessively contractionary macroeconomic policy in the face of supply shocks. To these policy failures were added the effects of a series of unfavourable supply shocks.​[6]​

Similarly, the subsequent transition to a higher growth path was brought about by a heterodox set of policies, whose effects were accentuated by a number of favourable supply shocks. The very initial escape from the ‘dismal decade’ was engineered by expansionary macroeconomic policy everywhere in the region. The inflationary consequences of expansionism differed across countries because of differences in circumstances, but the common effect in each case was a growth spurt based on elimination of the excess capacity that had built up during the preceding phase of retardation. Such artificial resuscitation of the economy could not be sustained for long, however, as stresses emerged in the form of external payments crisis and mounting debt burden. At that point, the region was rescued by wide-ranging liberalising reforms that all the countries had adopted, with varying degrees of intensity, trying to make a decisive break with the statist past. Trade liberalisation was an important part of this reform process, but no less important was internal liberalization – in the arenas of industrial regulation, financial system, distribution, power generation, and so on. Rapid growth of agriculture also contributed significantly to economic recovery. At the same time a number of favourable exogenous shocks also helped – most notably, phenomenal growth of workers’ remittances from which every country of the region benefited and the Multi-Fibre Agreement which played a key role in all countries except India to invigorate the industrial sector by ensuring rapid growth of the readymade garments sector.

The important part of this dynamic that concerns us most in the present context is the manner in which the initial escape from the ‘dismal decade’ occurred. Expansionary macroeconomic policy was the common mechanism through which each country of South Asia engineered the initial breakthrough. Economic slowdown of the 1970s had led to the emergence of considerable excess capacity throughout South Asia, especially in the manufacturing sector and in the labour market. Given this background, the tried and tested Keynesian remedy of expansion of aggregate demand proved to be a very convenient way of getting out of the economic morass. Whether the governments of South Asia deliberately employed the Keynesian strategy or whether it emerged by default is a moot question; what is indisputable is the fact that economic recovery came on the back of significant expansion of aggregate demand in each country. The precise manner in which the expansion of demand occurred in Bangladesh was, however, different from what happened in the rest of South Asia, and we shall argue below that this difference has had a significant bearing on the difference that has recently emerged in the fiscal constraints faced by these countries.

It is instructive to examine in some details what exactly happened in each country. To begin with India, it may be noted that for the first three decades after Independence Indian macroeconomic policy had been remarkably conservative. Indeed, one of the distinctive features of India’s industrialization strategy has been that, unlike the Latin American countries which combined import substitution with fiscal indiscipline and monetary laxity, India adopted a fairly conservative fiscal-monetary stance during its import substitution regime and thereby avoided the Latin American type inflationary pressures. Around the late 1960s, this stance became even more conservative in response to a succession of shocks to the economy. These shocks included permanent reduction in foreign aid following the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, the consecutive droughts of 1965/66 and 1966/67, a prolonged period of poor harvest that crippled the economy from 1972 to 1975, and the oil price shock of 1973. The effects if these shocks were to dampen aggregate demand on the one hand and generate cost-push inflationary pressures on the other. The government’s response to the inflationary pressure was to adopt a restrictive fiscal-monetary stance.​[7]​  As bad harvests at home and rising commodity prices abroad combined in the early 1970s to push up the rate of inflation, the government squeezed the fiscal sector further by cutting expenditure and raising taxes and restrained the growth of money supply by raising the interest rate.

These restrictive policies, coupled with the reduction of foreign aid, made it impossible to sustain the high level of public investment that India had achieved earlier. The growth of public investment fell from over 10 per cent per annum in the decade ending 1965-66 to 4.5 per cent in the following decade. In consequence, manufacturing investment in state-owned heavy industries fell and general infrastructural investment also suffered badly. While the deceleration in infrastructural investment created bottlenecks for industrial expansion from the supply side, the decline in public investment as a whole caused problem from the demand side as well. In particular, it led to reduced demand for capital goods, thereby inducing a marked decline in capacity utilization of the heavy industries that had grown up in the Nehru-Mahalanobis era. At the same time, the generally restrictive nature of macroeconomic policies, in conjunction with repeated bad harvests, kept the level of aggregate demand depressed, resulting in low capacity utilization in the consumer goods sectors as well.

Towards the end of the 1970s, however, the government’s stance on macroeconomic policy was completely reversed. Not only did the government shed its traditional conservative approach towards fiscal policy, it actually went overboard in doing so and began to indulge in excessive, and in retrospect irresponsible, fiscal expansionism. The budget deficit of the central government shot up from 4.0 per cent of GDP in the 1970s to 7.1 per cent in the 1980s, while the deficit of the state governments increased from 2.0 per cent to 2.9 per cent of GDP during the same period. The rise in deficit was not caused by any problem on the revenue front, however. Indeed, the combined revenues of central and state governments increased quite healthily from 15.9 per cent of GDP to 19.0 per cent. And yet the deficit soared, simply because the government spent too much; the combined expenditures of central and state governments shot up from 20.7 per cent of GDP in the 1970s to 28.8 per cent in the 1980s. In the presence of excess capacity in the manufacturing sector inherited from the slump of the 1970s, manufacturing output grew rapidly in response to fiscal expansionism.​[8]​ At the same time, inflation remained virtually unchanged, partly because higher demand was accompanied by higher output, thanks to excess capacity, and partly because budget deficits were financed more by domestic borrowing – mainly from commercial banks – than by monetary expansion.

For Pakistan too, expansion of demand in the presence of excess capacity turned out to be the escape route. In Pakistan’s case, the excess capacity had been created not only by the economic slump of the 1970s but also by the avowedly socialist policies adopted by the Bhutto regime. A number of large firms belonging to the basic industries sector as well as public utilities were nationalised in January 1972. Subsequently, many consumer goods industries were also nationalised by breaking the promises to the contrary that Bhutto had made earlier. All this may have compromised efficiency and dampened the incentive for private investment, but at least one good thing came out of this process – a huge public investment programme was undertaken towards the end of his regime to boost the capacity of public sector undertakings. These investments came rather late in the day for the Bhutto regime to benefit from their fruition, but at least they laid the foundation for recovery by adding to the excess capacity upon which the expansionary policy of the subsequent regime of Zia-ul-Haq could work.

Demand expansion itself was stimulated in the first instance by expansionary fiscal policy, as in India, which saw budget deficits rise from 5.3 per cent of GDP in the 1970s to 7.1 per cent in the 1980s. The deficit was mostly financed by domestic borrowing – mainly in the form of mopping up a large chunk of the rising inflow of workers’ remittances, which had become a major phenomenon in the Pakistan economy. An additional policy instrument was the exchange rate policy. The erstwhile fixed and overvalued exchange rate was freed, which led to a massive devaluation of the Rupee providing a strong demand boost to exports.

The story is essentially similar for Sri Lanka, except that the circumstances that had brought about the excess capacity in the 1970s were slightly different. Like India, Sri Lanka too resorted to contractionary macroeconomic policy in the 1970s to contain inflationary pressures generated by unfavourable supply shocks, but these were much less severe than in the case of India. What really created excess capacity in Sri Lanka was a serious balance of payments crisis that turned into a binding foreign exchange constraint. During the import substitution regime of the 1960s, Sri Lanka had become heavily dependent on imported raw materials for feeding its growing manufacturing sector. As the foreign exchange constraint became binding in the 1970s, those industries found themselves starved of essential raw materials and intermediate inputs. The consequence was a marked economic slowdown accompanied by the emergence of excess capacity of an unprecedented scale.

Things turned around after a new political regime of liberal economic persuasion assumed power in 1977. The new government immediately embarked upon an ambitious reform programme aimed at revival of growth through import liberalization and export expansion. In the event, growth did revive but it is arguable that at least in the initial stage the liberalising reforms were not the chief instrument of growth revival – expansion of domestic demand was.​[9]​ The expansion of demand was brought about by two major events that occurred along with the liberalizing reforms of 1977. First, the government embarked upon an investment programme of unprecedented magnitude with two major components – one involving irrigation and land development under the Mahaweli Development Project and the other involving an ambitious programme of housing for the poor. Secondly, the investment effort was supported by exceptionally generous flow of foreign assistance from western donors who were keen to ensure the success of Sri Lanka's pioneering effort at economic liberalization.

In striking similarity to what happened in India and Pakistan, the investment boom was financed largely by running massive budget deficits. The average annual budget deficit soared from about 8 per cent of GDP during 1970-77 to 19 per cent during 1978-83. Inflation also soared at the same time – from an average of 5.7 per cent during 1970-77, it jumped to 13.3 per cent during 1978-89. Rising inflation eroded the competitiveness of the export sector, thereby nullifying the combined effects of devaluation, import liberalization and export incentives offered by the liberalization programme. The real exchange rate remained virtually constant during the 1980s, resulting in the failure of liberalization to induce a broad-based export-oriented growth. However, inflationary macro-policy did succeed in creating a buoyant domestic demand, stimulating a relatively broad-based manufacturing growth based on fuller utilization of the excess capacity that had emerged in the ‘dismal decade’. This process was helped by the easing of the foreign exchange constraint as the generous flow of foreign aid made available enough foreign exchange to import the intermediate and capital goods needed by the country.

Bangladesh too followed the expansionary route in the early 1980s, but the mechanism in this case was significantly different – it was more a matter of credit expansion through the banking system rather than fiscal profligacy. The motivation behind this expansion was also different – it was designed to promote a fledgling private industrial class. The root of this policy goes back to the Pakistan period, when most of the modern industries were owned and operated either by the state or by West Pakistani entrepreneurs or by other non-Bengali entrepreneurs who had migrated from India at the time of partition of British India in 1947. Almost all the non-local entrepreneurs, along with a large pool of skilled workers belonging to the non-Bengali migrant class, left Bangladesh for Pakistan after 1971, leaving behind a huge vacuum of entrepreneurial ability and industrial skill and rendering a large number of modern industries ownerless. The government had the option of either nationalizing these industries or auctioning them off to private entrepreneurs. In the event, the first option was chosen partly because of the absence of a strong indigenous entrepreneurial class, and partly in deference to the socialist ideal of the leaders of the newly independent country. All large industries beyond a certain level of fixed assets were nationalized, including those owned by local entrepreneurs. In the process, as much as 92 per cent of the fixed assets of the formal manufacturing sector came to be owned by the public sector by 1972. Furthermore, limitations were soon imposed on the size and type of new private industrial enterprises in order to prevent the emergence of a dominant capitalist class. 

This strategy began to change, however, towards the end of the 1970s. Some early steps were taken in the second half of the 1970s to stimulate the private sector by raising the ceiling on fixed assets allowed for private enterprises. At the same time, the process of denationalization was initiated, which gathered momentum with the adoption of the New Industrial Policy (NIP) in 1982. By 1985, only about 40 per cent of industrial assets remained in the public sector as compared with 90 per cent in the early 1970s. This was an important turning point in the economic history of Bangladesh as from this point on private enterprise was to become the dominant vehicle for industrial growth.

What concerns us particularly here is the manner in which the entrepreneurial class was nurtured. The potential buyers of state-owned enterprises were lured with cheap credit from the nationalized banking system, resulting in a credit boom of unprecedented proportions. Money supply increased rapidly as a result – the growth rate of broad money jumped from an average of 20 per cent in the second half of the 1970s to close to 30 per cent in the first half of the 1980s. Not surprisingly, as strong growth of money supply resulted in rapid demand expansion, the rate of inflation also jumped pari passu from 6-7 per cent per annum to about 13 per cent.

This monetary route to demand expansion had its own consequences, which we shall discuss later in the paper, but the point we wish to emphasize at this stage is the contrast with the fiscal route to expansion in the rest of South Asia. This contrast can be seen most clearly from Table 6, which reports some statistics on budget deficits in the region. The really interesting figures here are not the overall budget deficits, which include financing of government expenditure through foreign aid, but domestic financing of budget deficits, because it is the latter that is relevant to the theme of domestic debt and the interest burden that we are trying to draw attention to in this paper. It is remarkable how low Bangladesh’s figures are relative to the rest of the region. Thus, in the 1980s, domestic financing of budget deficits constituted only 0.8 per cent of GDP in Bangladesh, as compared with 7.4 per cent in India, 6 per cent in Sri Lanka and 5.3 per cent in Pakistan. Over the years, the figure has risen somewhat in Bangladesh but it has never approached the much higher figures obtaining in the rest of the region.




























     Domestic financing	6.00	5.76	6.46
Primary budget deficit		3.37	2.49
Note: Primary budget deficit is defined as (gross) budget deficit minus interest payment.




The problems that emerged from fiscal expansionism in the rest of South Asia took somewhat different forms. In India, expansion of domestic demand spilled over into serious balance of payments crisis, leading to an external debt problem of a kind that the country had never experienced before. For the first time in its history, the country came close to defaulting on its external debt in 1991, prompting the adoption of a package of wide-ranging reforms that eventually rescued the country.​[11]​ Pakistan faced a similar balance of payments crisis for very similar reasons, but compounded by the drying up of foreign remittances with the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991.​[12]​ The story is similar in Sri Lanka, except that the balance of payments problem was aggravated by two other factors, both of which were also the legacy of fiscal profligacy of the past.​[13]​  First, by keeping the inflation rate high, the expansionist policy led to persistent appreciation of the real exchange rate, leading to loss of export competitiveness and slowdown in the growth of manufactured exports. Second, rising public debt, resulting from fiscal deficits, encouraged the government to keep the interest rate artificially low so as to reduce its debt servicing burden. In the face of high inflation, however, this policy resulted in negative real interest rate, to the determinant of savings. As a result, the rate of domestic savings fell despite rising per capita income.

These problems of fiscal expansionism – namely, rampant inflation, spill-over into balance of payments crisis, negative real interest rate and the resulting dampening effect on savings, and appreciation of real exchange rate resulting in the loss of export competitiveness – are well-known phenomena and have been widely discussed in the context of South Asia and elsewhere. What has been much less noticed is the kind of problems that can stem from mounting domestic debt created by persistent fiscal deficits financed by domestic borrowing. A particularly revealing way of appreciating the nature of the problem is to contrast the gross budget deficits of South Asian countries with their primary budget deficits – the latter being measured by subtracting interest payment from the former. As can be seen from Table 6, despite very high gross budget deficits in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in the post-1990 period, their primary budget deficits have remained surprisingly low. For instance, in the 1990s, India had an average budget deficit of 7.3 per cent of GDP but primary deficit of only 2.3 per cent; for Sri Lanka the figures are 9.3 and 3.4 per cent respectively, and for Pakistan they were 6.9 and 0.1 respectively.






The concern with fiscal deficits typically takes two forms. When the deficits are financed by printing money, the concern is with inflation and the consequences that follow from it. And when the deficits are financed by domestic borrowing, the concern is with ‘crowding out’ – i.e., the idea that by absorbing a large chunk of the available loanable funds and by raising the interest rate excessive public borrowing might squeeze out private investment. The latter phenomenon points to the possibility of a contemporaneous trade-off between public and private investment. This paper has tried to highlight a different kind of trade-off – an inter-temporal trade-off between public investment financed by public borrowing today and public investment in the future. A debt-financed spree in public investment may stimulate aggregate demand that might lead to a growth spurt in the short run and, if used wisely, may also create necessary infrastructure for future growth, but if persisted for too long then the accumulation of debt and the resulting debt servicing burden may create a fiscal constraint down the road that might force a reduction in public investment in the future. This particular trade-off between present and future investment has been well discussed in the literature on external debt, but that a similar problem may also arise with domestic debt has not been generally recognised.​[16]​ 

The present paper illustrates the danger of accumulating domestic debt by analysing the recent growth experience of South Asia – in particular by contrasting the experience of Bangladesh with the rest of the region. All the countries of the region followed the Keynesian path of demand expansion in the 1980s that helped revive their economies from the relative stagnation of the 1970s. The precise mechanism of demand expansion differed, however. In Bangladesh, the expansion came chiefly through monetary growth stemming from cheap credit provided by the nationalised banking sector to private entrepreneurs as part of a large-scale privatisation programme. The more common fiscal route to demand expansion was not involved in this case. By contrast, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka resorted to persistent and large-scale fiscal deficits, financed largely by domestic borrowing, to stimulate their economies. Economic growth did revive in the short run, but only at the cost of storing up several problems for the future. One of the problems, one that has been least discussed in South Asia, was that the accumulation of domestic debt led to such a high burden of debt servicing that from the 1990s onwards these countries had to run very high budget deficits simply to keep up with interest payments. The result was that although deficits were running at a much higher level than in the past far fewer resources were available for development expenditure and public investment. In fact, public investment as a share of GDP declined significantly in these countries, which acted as a brake on overall investment and prevented them from achieving steady acceleration of growth (until very recently, in India) despite many liberalising reforms they had initiated from the 1980s onwards. Bangladesh, by contrast, did not have to face the same fiscal constraint as it did not choose the fiscal route to demand expansion in the 1980s. Its monetary route to expansion entailed its own problems, but at least the country was spared the constraint to public investment arising from mounting debt burden. As a result, Bangladesh turned out to be only country in the region that was able to improve upon the rate of public investment in the quarter century from 1980, and the only country in the region that was able to maintain a steady acceleration of economic growth during this period.
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^1	  For the purposes of the present study, South Asia refers to the big four countries of the region – viz., India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
^2	  The Indian growth rate did, however, accelerate sharply after 2005.
^3	  External debt has been less of an issue in South Asia (except for some occasional crisis, as in 1991 in India), especially in comparison with Latin America and some parts of East Asia, since the countries of this region have relied primarily on foreign aid, most of which was concessionary in nature, rather than on commercial borrowing.
^4	  The South Asian performance in the 1970s was not nearly as bad as the Latin American one in the 1980s to warrant the description of a ‘lost decade’ but was bad enough to be called a ‘dismal decade’. It should also be noted that the actual span of the ‘dismal decade’ was slightly different for different countries; it was 1972/73 – 1980/81 for Bangladesh, 1967/68 – 1980/81 for India, 1971/72 – 1976/77 for Pakistan and 1971 – 1977 for Sri Lanka.
^5	  See Osmani (2008) for a detailed discussion.
^6	  The oil price shock of 1973 was common across the region but in addition each country had its own idiosyncratic shocks – for instance, droughts in India; loss of half of the country and agricultural disruptions caused by unprecedented floods and pest attacks in Pakistan; severe decline in the terms of trade of the most important export commodity and agricultural disruptions caused by a rural uprising and inclement weather in Sri Lanka; and the ravages of a prolonged war of Liberation in Bangladesh.
^7	  For insightful analysis of the evolution of macroeconomic policies over the 1970s and the 1980s and their consequences, see Ahluwalia (1986) and Joshi and Little (1994). For analysis of the linkage between restrictive macroeconomic policies and industrial deceleration, see Singh and Ghosh (1988).
^8	  To some extent, manufacturing growth was also helped by (partial) import liberalization – mainly, liberalization of capital goods import.
^9	  For details of the argument, see Osmani (2008).
^10	  See Mahmud (2004) for an authoritative account of the processes behind industrial slowdown in Bangladesh in the 1980s.
^11	  For a thorough analysis of the genesis of the crisis of 1991 and the reform process it prompted, see, inter alia, Ahluwalia (2002), Srinivasan and Tendulkar (2003) and Virmani (2004).
^12	  See Hasan (2008) for a clear analysis of the forces operating behind the debacle of the 1990s, as part of an excellent overview of Pakistan’s growth experience.
^13	  Kelegama (2008) provides a perceptive analysis of the legacies left by the fiscal profligacy of the 1980s.
^14	  Since interest payment constitutes a part of revenue expenditure, this phenomenon also explains why, as noted earlier, revenue expenditure could not be curtailed even as development expenditures plunged.
^15	  This is not to deny the possible roles played by other factors such as balance of payments constraints, rising levels of defence expenditure, and political turmoil (especially in Sri Lanka and Pakistan).
^16	  Indeed, the very idea that domestic debt can be a problem for growth and development has been largely ignored in the economic literature. In a recent paper, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) bemoan this fact, point out that because of the lack of attention paid to the problem in the past reliable data on domestic debt is not as widely available as data on external debt, and make a pioneering attempt to collect and analyse internationally comparable data on domestic debt across countries and over time.
